In the age of cloud computing, cloud users with a limited amount of storage can outsource their data to remote servers. The cloud servers, in lieu of monetary benefits, offer retrievability of their clients' data at any point of time. Secure cloud storage protocols ensure the integrity of the outsourced data that can be dynamic (or static) in nature depending on whether the client can (or cannot) update the uploaded data as needed. In this work, we explore the possibility of constructing a secure cloud storage for dynamic data by leveraging the idea of secure network coding. Specifically, we fail to provide a general construction of an efficient secure cloud storage protocol for dynamic data from an arbitrary secure network coding protocol. However, we show that some of the secure network coding schemes with some properties can be used to construct secure cloud storage protocols for dynamic data, and we indeed construct a publicly verifiable secure cloud storage protocol based on a secure network coding protocol. To the best of our knowledge, our scheme is the first secure cloud storage protocol for dynamic data that is based on a secure network coding protocol and that is secure in the standard model. In a publicly verifiable setting, auditing task is often delegated to a third party auditor that audits the outsourced data on behalf of a client. It is desirable that the auditor gains no knowledge about the actual content of the client's data which may be sensitive. We extend our scheme in order to provide privacy-preserving audits where the content of the client's data is protected from the third party auditor. Furthermore, we extend our scheme in order to offer anonymity of a user updating shared data in an enterprise setting. In this setting, the cloud server cannot distinguish the user (belonging to a group) updating the data shared among the users of that group. We compare the performance of our secure cloud storage protocol with that of other secure cloud storage schemes and discuss some limitations of our scheme. Finally, we provide another construction of a secure cloud storage protocol that is specialized for append-only data and that overcomes some of the limitations of our earlier scheme.
Introduction
With the advent of cloud computing, cloud servers offer to their clients various facilities that include delegation of huge amount of computation and outsourcing large amount of data (say, in the order of terabytes). For example, a client (cloud user) having a smart phone with a low-performance processor or a limited amount of storage capacity cannot accomplish this heavy computation on its own or cannot store such a large volume of data in its own storage. The client can delegate her computation or storage to the cloud server. Now, the client only has to download the result of the computation or has to read (or update) the required portion of the uploaded data.
In case of storage outsourcing, the cloud server stores a massive volume of data on behalf of its clients (data owners). However, a malicious cloud server can delete some of the client's data (that are not accessed frequently) in order to save space. Secure cloud storage (SCS) protocols (two-party protocols between the client and the server) provide a mechanism to ensure that the client's data are stored untampered in the server. Depending on the nature of the data to be outsourced, secure cloud storage protocols are classified as: SCS protocols for static data (SSCS) [4, 31, 47] and SCS protocols for dynamic data (DSCS) [22, 52, 11, 48] . For static data, the client cannot change her data after the initial outsourcing (suitable mostly for backup or archival data). Dynamic data are more generic in that the client can modify her data as often as needed. In SCS protocols, the client can audit her data stored in the server without accessing the whole data file, and still, be able to detect an unwanted modification of the data done by a malicious server. The SCS protocols are publicly verifiable if the audits can be performed by any third party auditor (TPA) with the knowledge of public parameters only; they are privately verifiable if one needs some secret information of the client in order to perform an audit. In privacy-preserving audits (for publicly verifiable SCS protocols only), the TPA cannot learn the actual content of any portion of the data file.
In a network coding protocol [2, 36] , every intermediate node (all nodes except the source and target nodes) in a communication network combines the incoming packets to output another packet. These protocols enjoy much improved throughput, efficiency and scalability compared to the conventional store-and-forward routing where an incoming packet is relayed as it is. However, these protocols are prone to pollution attacks caused by malicious intermediate nodes that inject invalid packets in the network. These invalid packets produce more such packets downstream. In the worst case, the target node cannot decode the original file sent to it via the network. Secure network coding (SNC) protocols use cryptographic primitives in order to prevent these attacks. In an SNC protocol, the source node authenticates each of the packets to be transmitted through the network by attaching a small tag to it. These authentication tags are generated using homomorphic message authentication codes (MACs) [1] or homomorphic signatures [14, 8, 26, 12] . Due to the homomorphic property of the tags, every intermediate node can combine the incoming packets to output another packet along with its authentication tag.
In a recent work, Chen et al. [16] show that, given a secure network coding (SNC) protocol, one can construct a secure cloud storage (SSCS) protocol for static data using the SNC protocol. However, their construction does not handle (more generic) dynamic data that makes it insufficient in many cloud applications where a client needs to update (insert, delete or modify) her data efficiently. Clearly, a naive way to update data in this scenario is to download the whole data file, perform the required updates and upload the file to the server again; but this procedure is highly inefficient as it requires huge amount of communication bandwidth for every update. Thus, further investigations are needed towards an efficient construction of a secure cloud storage (DSCS) protocol for dynamic data using an SNC protocol. In addition, there are various practical applications where append-only data need to be stored with a guarantee of retrievability (e.g., ledgers containing transactions, medical history of patients and different log data). Therefore, a more efficient solution (specifically for append-only data) would be helpful in this scenario.
Our Contribution In this paper, we provide a construction of a secure cloud storage protocol from a secure network coding (SNC) protocol. Our construction handles dynamic data, that is, the client can efficiently perform updates (insertion, deletion and modification) on her data outsourced to the cloud server. Our contributions are summarized as follows.
-We explore the possibility of providing a general construction of a DSCS protocol from any SNC protocol. We discuss about the challenges for such a general construction in details, and we identify some SNC protocols such that efficient DSCS protocols can be constructed using them. Indeed, we provide a basic construction of a DSCS protocol (DSCS I) from such an SNC protocol proposed by Catalano et al. [12] . Our construction is secure in the standard model and offers public verifiability. -As our scheme is publicly verifiable, the client can delegate the auditing task to a third party auditor. She may also prefer her sensitive data not to be disclosed to the auditor. We extend our basic DSCS I construction in order to support privacy-preserving audits where the third party auditor cannot gain knowledge of the actual content of the data file owned by the client. -In an enterprise setting, a group of users can share and update the outsourced data file. However, it is sometimes desirable to hide the identity of the user (from the cloud server) updating the data file. We extend DSCS I in order to preserve user-anonymity where the cloud server cannot distinguish the actual user in the group updating the file. -We analyze the efficiency of DSCS I and compare it with other existing secure cloud storage protocols. We discuss about some limitations of an SNC-based SCS protocol (for static or dynamic data). -We construct another publicly verifiable secure cloud storage protocol (DSCS II) for append-only data using an SNC protocol proposed by Boneh et al. [8] . This construction is secure in the random oracle model and overcomes some of the limitations of our earlier construction.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss about the notations we use in this paper, and we briefly describe the secure network coding and the secure cloud storage protocols along with their respective security models. Section 3 begins with a detailed discussion on the general construction of a DSCS protocol using an SNC protocol. Then, we describe our construction (DSCS I) that is based on a secure network coding protocol. In Section 4, we analyze the security of DSCS I and the probabilistic guarantees it offers. In Section 5, we extend our basic DSCS I scheme in order to support privacy-preserving audits. Section 6 describes a way in which DSCS I can be modified to preserve the user-anonymity in an enterprise setting. In Section 7, we analyze the efficiency of DSCS I and compare its performance with the existing secure cloud storage schemes. Section 8 describes our second construction of a secure cloud storage (DSCS II) that deals with append-only data. In the concluding Section 9, we summarize the work done in this paper.
Preliminaries and Background

Notation
We take λ to be the security parameter. An algorithm A(1 λ ) is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm when its running time is polynomial in λ and its output y is a random variable which depends on the internal coin tosses of A. An element a chosen uniformly at random from a set S is denoted as a R ← − S. A function f : N → R is called negligible in λ if for all positive integers c and for all sufficiently large λ, we have f (λ) < 1 λ c . In general, F is used to denote a finite field. The multiplication of a vector v by a scalar s is denoted by s · v. The terms packet and vector are used interchangeably in this work.
Secure Network Coding
Ahlswede et al. [2] introduce network coding as a replacement of the conventional store-and-forward routing for networks. In network coding, intermediate nodes (or routers) encode the received packets to output another packet which increases the throughput of the network (optimal in case of multicasting). Linear network coding was proposed by Li et al. [36] . Here, the file F to be transmitted is divided into several (say, m) packets (or vectors) v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v m each consisting of n components (or blocks), and each of these components is an element of a finite field F. In other words, each v i ∈ F n for i ∈ [1, m] . Then, the sender (or source) node augments each vector to form another vector u i = [v i e i ] ∈ F n+m for i ∈ [1, m] , where e i is the m-dimensional unit vector containing 1 in the i-th position and 0 in others. Thus, the collection of m augmented vectors can be illustrated as
Finally, the sender transmits these augmented vectors to the network. Let V ⊂ F n+m be the linear subspace spanned by these augmented vectors u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u m . A random file identifier fid is associated with the file F (or V ). An intermediate node in the network outputs a linear combination of the received packets. In random (linear) network coding [29, 28] , the coefficients of these linear combinations are chosen uniformly at random from the field F. An intermediate node in the network, upon receiving l packets y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y l ∈ F n+m , chooses l coefficients ν 1 , ν 2 , . . . , ν l Definition 1 (Secure Network Coding). A secure network coding (SNC) protocol consists of the following algorithms.
-SNC.KeyGen(1 λ , m, n): This procedure generates a secret key-public key pair K = (sk, pk) for the sender.
-SNC.TagGen(V, sk, m, n, fid): On input a linear subspace V ⊂ F n+m , the secret key sk and a random file identifier fid associated with V , the sender runs this procedure to produce the authentication tag t for V . -SNC.Combine({y i , t i , ν i } 1 i l , pk, m, n, fid): Given l incoming packets y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y l ∈ F n+m and their corresponding tags t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t l for a file associated with fid, an intermediate node chooses l random coefficients ν 1 , ν 2 , . . . , ν l R ← − F and runs this procedure. The procedure outputs another packet w ∈ F n+m and its authentication tag t such that w = l i=1 ν i · y i . -SNC.Verify(w, t, K, m, n, fid): An intermediate node or the receiver node, on input a packet w and its tag t for a file associated with fid, executes this procedure which returns 1 if t is authentic for the packet w; returns 0, otherwise.
In some schemes, the procedure SNC.Verify requires only the public key pk [8, 26, 12] . The knowledge of the secret key sk is necessary to verify the incoming packets in other schemes [1] .
Security of an SNC Protocol
The security of an SNC protocol based on a homomorphic signature scheme is defined by the security game between a challenger and a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A as stated below [12] .
-Setup
The adversary A provides the values m and n of its choice to the challenger. The challenger runs SNC.KeyGen(1 λ , m, n) to output K = (sk, pk) and returns pk to A. -Queries The adversary A specifies a sequence (adaptively chosen) of vector spaces V i ⊂ F n+m by respective augmented basis vectors {u i1 , u i2 , . . . , u im } and asks the challenger to authenticate the vector spaces. For each i, the challenger chooses a random file identifier fid i from a predefined space, generates an authentication tag t i by running SNC.TagGen(V i , sk, m, n, fid i ) and gives t i to A. -Forgery The adversary A outputs (fid * , w * , t * ).
Let the output vector w * = [w * 1 , w * 2 , . . . , w * n+m ] ∈ F n+m . Then, the adversary A wins the security game mentioned above if [w * n+1 , w * n+2 , . . . , w * n+m ] ∈ F m is not the all-zero vector, SNC.Verify(w * , t * , pk, m, n, fid * ) outputs 1 and one of the following conditions is satisfied: 1. fid * = fid i for all i (type-1 forgery) 2. fid * = fid i for some i, but w * ∈ V i (type-2 forgery).
For a secure network coding (SNC) protocol, the probability that the adversary A wins the security game is negligible in the security parameter λ.
We note that the security game for an SNC protocol based on homomorphic MACs is exactly the same as the game described above, except that the procedure SNC.KeyGen now produces a secret key only (unknown to A) and the verification procedure SNC.Verify requires the knowledge of this secret key.
Secure Cloud Storage
Clients (cloud users) may want to outsource their huge amount of data to the cloud storage server. As the cloud service provider (possibly malicious) might discard old data to save some space, the clients need to be convinced that the outsourced data are stored untampered by the cloud server. A naive approach to ensure data integrity is that a client downloads the whole data from the server and verifies them individually segment by segment. However, this process is inefficient in terms of communication bandwidth required.
Building Blocks: PDP and POR Researchers come up with proofs of storage in order to resolve the issue mentioned above. Ateniese et al. [4] introduce the concept of provable data possession (PDP) where the client computes an authentication tag (for example, MAC) for each segment of her data (or file), and uploads the file along with the authentication tags. During an audit protocol, the client samples a predefined number of random segment-indices (challenge) and sends them to the server. We denote the cardinality of the challenge set by l which is typically taken to be O(λ). The server does some computations (depending upon the challenge) over the stored data, and sends a proof (response) to the client who verifies the integrity of her data based on this proof. This scheme also introduces the notion of public verifiability 1 where the client (data owner) can delegate the auditing task to a third party auditor (TPA). Then, the TPA with the knowledge of the public key performs an audit. For privately verifiable schemes, only the client having knowledge of the secret key can verify the proof sent by the server. Other schemes achieving PDP include [5, 22, 52, 51, 23] .
The first paper introducing proofs of retrievability (POR) for static data is by Juels and Kaliski [31] (a similar idea is given for sublinear authenticators by Naor and Rothblum [40] ). According to Shacham and Waters [47] , the underlying idea of a POR scheme is to encode the original file with an erasure code [37, 44] , authenticate the segments of the encoded file, and then upload them on the storage server. With this technique, the server has to delete or modify a considerable number of segments to actually delete or modify a data segment. This ensures that all segments of the file are retrievable from the responses of the server which passes an audit with some non-negligible probability. Following the work by Juels and Kaliski, several POR schemes have been proposed [10, 20, 49, 11, 48, 13, 3] . Some of these schemes are designed for static data, and the rest allow the client to modify data after the initial outsourcing.
As we deal with a single cloud server in this work, we only mention some secure cloud storage protocols in a distributed setting. Some of them include the works by Curtmola et al. [18] (using replication of data) and Bowers et al. [9] (using error-correcting codes and erasure codes). Dimakis et al. [19] introduce network coding in distributed storage systems where linear combinations of data segments are disseminated to multiple servers. In terms of repair bandwidth (bandwidth required to repair a failed server), this technique is more efficient than using the conventional erasure codes for distributing the segments. For such a distributed storage system, there are schemes for remote integrity checking [15, 35, 41] designed to achieve fast repair of a failed server.
We define an SCS protocol for dynamic data (DSCS) below [22] . A DSCS protocol can be privately verifiable if the verification algorithm of the protocol involves the secret key sk of the client; it is publicly verifiable, otherwise. In general, the term verifier is used to denote an auditor for a secure cloud storage. The client (for a privately verifiable protocol) or a third party auditor (for a publicly verifiable protocol) can act as the verifier. 
Construction of an SCS Protocol for Dynamic Data Using an SNC Protocol
Chen et al. [16] propose a generic construction of a secure cloud storage protocol for static data from a secure network coding protocol. They consider the data file F to be stored in the server to be a collection of m vectors (or packets) each of which consists of n blocks. The underlying idea is to store these vectors (without augmenting them with unit vectors) along with their authentication tags in the server. During an audit, the client sends an l-element subset of the set of indices {1, 2, . . . , m} to the server. The server augments those vectors with the corresponding unit vectors, combines them linearly in an authenticated fashion and sends the output vector along with its tag to the client. Finally, the client verifies the authenticity of the received tag against the received vector. Thus, the server acts as an intermediate node, and the client acts as both the sender and the receiver (or the next intermediate router). We briefly discuss the algorithms involved in the general construction in Appendix A.
In a secure network coding protocol, the number of packets (or vectors) in the file to be transmitted through the network is fixed. This is because the length of the coefficient vectors used to augment the original vectors has to be determined a priori. That is why, a general construction of a secure cloud storage protocol as discussed above is suitable for static data in general. On the other hand, in a secure cloud storage protocol for dynamic data, clients can modify their data after they upload them to the cloud server initially. In this section, we discuss whether we can provide a general framework for constructing an efficient and secure cloud storage protocol for dynamic data (DSCS) from an SNC protocol.
On the General Construction of an Efficient DSCS Protocol from an SNC Protocol
In a secure network coding (SNC) protocol, a tag is associated with each packet such that the integrity of a packet can be verified using its tag. The SNC protocols found in the literature use homomorphic MACs [1] or homomorphic signatures [14, 8, 26, 6, 12] . Following are the challenges in constructing an efficient DSCS protocol from these existing SNC protocols. We exclude, in our discussion, the work of Attrapadung and Libert [6] as their scheme is not efficient due to its reliance on (inefficient) composite-order bilinear groups.
1. The DSCS protocol must handle the varying values of m appropriately. In the network coding protocols mentioned above, the sender divides the file in m packets and augments them with unit coefficient vectors before sending them into the network. The length of these coefficient vectors is m which remains constant during transmission. In a secure cloud storage for dynamic data, the number of vectors may vary (for insertion and deletion). If we follow a similar general construction for a DSCS protocol as discussed above (for static data), we observe that the cloud server does not need to store the coefficient vectors. However, during an audit, the verifier selects a random l-element subset I of [1, m] and the server augments the vectors with unit coefficient vectors of dimension m before generating the proof. Therefore, the verifier and the server need to keep an updated value of m. This issue can be resolved in the following way. The client includes the value of m in her public key and updates its value for each authenticated insertion or deletion. Thus, its latest value is known to the verifier and the server. We assume that, for consistency, the client (data owner) does not update her data during an audit.
The index of a vector should not be embedded in its authentication tag.
In an SNC protocol, the file to be
The sender augments each vector to form another vector u
, where e i is the m-dimensional unit vector containing 1 in i-th position and 0 in others. Let V ⊂ F n+m be the linear subspace spanned by these augmented basis vectors u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u m . The sender authenticates the subspace V by authenticating these augmented vectors before transmitting them to the network [14, 1, 8, 26, 12] . In a scheme based on homomorphic MACs [1] , the sender generates a MAC for the i-th basis vector u i and the index i serves as an input to the MAC algorithm (for example, i is an input to the pseudorandom function in [1] ). On the other hand, for the schemes based on homomorphic signatures, the sender generates a signature t i on the i-th basis vector u i . In some schemes based on homomorphic signatures, the index i is embedded in the signature t i on the i-th augmented vector. For example, H(fid, i) is embedded in t i [8, 26] , where fid is the file identifier and H is a hash function modeled as a random oracle. Section 8.1 gives a brief overview of the scheme proposed by Boneh et al. [8] and shows how each t i includes the value H(fid, i) (see Eqn. 10). These schemes are not suitable for the construction of an efficient DSCS protocol due to the following reason. For dynamic data, the client can insert a vector in a specified position or delete an existing vector from a specified location. In both cases, the indices of the subsequent vectors are changed. Therefore, the client has to download all these subsequent vectors and compute fresh authentication tags for them before uploading the new vector-tag pairs to the cloud server. This makes the DSCS protocol inefficient. However, in a few schemes, instead of hashing vector indices as in [8, 26] , there is a one-to-one mapping from the set of indices to some group [14, 12] , and these group elements are made public. This increases the size of the public key of these schemes. However, an efficient DSCS protocol can be constructed from them. In fact, we construct a DSCS protocol (described in Section 3.3) based on the SNC protocol proposed by Catalano et al. [12] . We note that Chen et al. [16] construct an SCS protocol from the same SNC protocol, but for static data only. 3. The freshness of data must be guaranteed. The freshness of storage requires that the server is storing an up-todate version of the data file. For dynamic data, the client can modify an existing vector. However, a malicious cloud server may discard this change and keep an old copy of the vector. As the old copy of the vector and its corresponding tag are valid, the client has no way to detect if the cloud server is storing the latest copy. We ensure the freshness of the client's data, in our DSCS construction, using an authenticated data structure (rank-based authenticated skip list) on the authentication tags of all the vectors. In other words, the authenticity of the vectors is maintained by their tags, and the integrity of the tags is in turn maintained by the skip list. The advantage of building the skip list on the tags (over building it on the vectors) is that the tags are much shorter than a vector, and this decreases the size of the proof sent by the server. When a vector is inserted (or modified), its tag is also updated and sent to the server. The server updates the skip list accordingly. For deletion of a vector, the server simply removes the corresponding tag from the skip list. Finally, the server sends to the client a proof of performing the required update properly. We briefly discuss, in Section 3.2, about rank-based authenticated skip lists that we use in our construction described in Section 3.3.
In addition to the requirements mentioned above, it is often desired that a DSCS protocol (an SCS protocol, in general) satisfies the following properties.
Public verifiability
For a publicly verifiable DSCS protocol, the auditing task can be delegated to a third party auditor (TPA). In a secure network coding protocol built on homomorphic MACs, the secret key (for example, the secret keys of the pseudorandom generator and the pseudorandom function in [1] ) is needed to verify the authenticity of an incoming packet. This property restricts the secure cloud storage protocol built on such an SNC protocol to be privately verifiable only.
Privacy-preserving audits
In privacy-preserving audits (for a publicly verifiable DSCS protocol), the TPA cannot gain the knowledge of the challenged vectors.
Rank-Based Authenticated Skip Lists
For dynamic data, we need some authenticated data structures like Merkle hash trees [38] , rank-based authenticated skip lists [22] and rank-based RSA trees [42, 22] to verify the freshness of each of the vectors. Erway et al. [22] propose rank-based authenticated skip lists based on labeled skip lists [27, 43] . We give a brief introduction to the procedures of rank-based authenticated skip lists stored remotely in a server as follows.
- Initially, all these information (except the label) are computed for each node in the skip list. In addition, the
Finally, for each node z, the label f (z) is computed using a collision-resistant hash function h as
)) and f 2 = h(l(z)||rank(z)||f (down(z))||f (right(z))). Fig. 1 illustrates a rank-based authenticated skip list for an ordered list {t 1 , . . . , t 9 }. The skip list along with all the associated information are stored in the server. The client only stores the value of m and the label of the root node r (i.e., f (r)) as the metadata d M . -ListAuthRead(i, m): When the client wants to read the i-th element t i , the server sends the requested element along with a proof Π(i) to the client. Let the verification path of the i-th element be a sequence of nodes z 1 , . . . , z k , where z 1 is the bottom-level node storing the i-th element and z k = r is the root node of the skip list (see Fig. 1 ). Then, the proof Π(i) is of the form
where A(z) = (l(z), q(z), d(z), g(z)). Here, l(z) is the level of the node z, d(z) is 0 (or 1) if down(z) (or right(z)) points to the previous node of z in the sequence, and q(z) and g(z) are the rank and label (respectively) of the successor node of z that is not present on the verification path. -ListVerifyRead(i, d M , t i , Π(i), m): Upon receiving the proof (t i , Π(i)) from the server, the client checks if the proof corresponds to the latest metadata d M stored at her end. The client outputs 1 if the proof matches with the metadata; she outputs 0, otherwise. Due to the collision-resistance property of the hash function h that is used to generate the labels of the nodes of the skip list, the server cannot pass the verification without storing the element t i properly, except with some probability negligible in the security parameter λ. Note One limitation of using dynamic versions of Merkle hash trees (for example, authenticated red-black trees) instead of rank-based authenticated skip lists is that a series of insertions after a particular location makes the tree imbalanced and increases the height of the tree by the number of insertions. In the two-party model as in our case, no efficient rebalancing techniques (for updating the authentication information of the affected nodes efficiently) for such a tree have been studied [22] . On the other hand, due to the properties of a skip list [43] , the number of levels in a skip list is logarithmic in m with high probability. For this reason, the size of a proof, the computation time for the server and the verification time for the client are O(log m) with high probability.
DSCS I: A DSCS Protocol Using an SNC Protocol
Following the work of Chen et al. [16] , we construct a secure cloud storage protocol for dynamic data (DSCS I) from the secure network coding (SNC) protocol proposed by Catalano et al. [12] which is secure in the standard model. This basic construction exploits a rank-based authenticated skip list (discussed in Section 3.2) to ensure the freshness of the dynamic data. DSCS I consists of the following procedures. Let h be the collision-resistant hash function used in the rank-based authenticated skip list we use in our construction. We assume that the file F to be outsourced to the server is a collection of m vectors where each of the vectors consists of n blocks. We note that the procedures KeyGen, Outsource, Prove and Verify in DSCS I call the procedures SNC.KeyGen, SNC.TagGen, SNC.Combine and SNC.Verify (respectively) of the underlying SNC protocol [12] along with performing some other operations related to the authenticated data structure. Here, we provide a detailed description.
-KeyGen(1 λ , m, n): The client selects two random safe primes 2 p, q of length λ/2 bits each and takes N = pq. The client chooses another random prime e of length λ + 1 (in bits) and sets the file identifier fid to be equal to e. She selects g, g 1 , . . . , g n , h 1 , . . . , h m R ← − Z * N . The secret key sk is (p, q), and the public key pk consists of (N, e, g, g 1 , . . . , g n , h 1 , . . . , h m , d M , m, n). Initially, d M is null. Let K = (sk, pk).
-Outsource(F, K, fid): The file F (associated with the identifier fid) consists of m vectors each of them having n blocks. We assume that each of these blocks is an element of F e . Then, for each 1 i m, the i-th vector v i is of the form [v i1 , . . . , v in ] ∈ F n e . For each vector v i , the client selects a random element s i R ← − F e and computes x i such that We assume that, for efficiency, the server keeps a local copy of the ordered list of h j values for 1 j m. Based on the value of updtype, the server performs one of the following operations.
1. If updtype is insertion, the server sets m = m + 1, inserts h ′ in the (i + 1)-th position in the list of h j values (for 1 j m) and inserts v ′ after the i-th vector. The server runs ListPerformUpdate on the input (i, updtype, t ′ , M ). 2. If updtype is modification (h ′ is null), the server modifies the i-th vector to v ′ and runs the procedure ListPerformUpdate on (i, updtype, t ′ , M ). by augmenting the vector v i with the unit coefficient vector e i . Then, it computes w = i∈I ν i · u i mod e ∈ F n+m e , w ′ = ( i∈I ν i · u i − w)/e ∈ F n+m e and
Let y ∈ F n e be the first n entries of w and t = (s, x). The server sends T = (T 1 , T 2 ) as a proof of storage corresponding to the challenge set Q, where T 1 = (y, t) and T 2 = {(t i , Π(i))} i∈I .
-Verify(Q, T, pk, fid): Using Q = {(i, ν i )} i∈I and T = (y, t) sent by the server, the verifier constructs a vector w = [w 1 , . . . , w n , w n+1 , . . . , w n+m ] ∈ F n+m e , where the first n entries of w are the same as those of y and the (n + i)-th entry is ν i if i ∈ I (0 if i ∈ I). Then, the verifier checks whether 
She also verifies if, for each i ∈ I, Π(i) is a valid proof (with respect to d M ) for t i . The verifier outputs 1 if the proof passes all the verifications; she outputs 0, otherwise.
The DSCS protocol described above is publicly verifiable as only the knowledge of the public key of the client (data owner) enables one to perform an audit (see the footnote in Section 2.3).
Security of DSCS I 4.1 Overview of Security of a DSCS Protocol
A secure DSCS protocol must satisfy the following properties [22, 48] . A formal security model is described in Section 4.2.
1. Authenticity The authenticity of storage requires that the cloud server cannot produce a valid proof of storage T ′ (corresponding to the challenge set Q) without storing the challenged segments and their respective authentication information untampered, except with a probability negligible in λ.
Freshness
The freshness of storage guarantees that the server is storing an up-to-date version of the file F . 3. Extractability The extractability (or retrievability) of data requires that, given a probabilistic polynomialtime adversary A that can respond correctly to a challenge Q with some non-negligible probability, there exists a polynomial-time extractor algorithm E that can extract (at least) the challenged segments (except with negligible probability) by challenging A for a polynomial (in λ) number of times and verifying the responses sent by A. The algorithm E has a non-black-box access to A. Thus, E can rewind A, if required.
Security Model
The DSCS I protocol offers the guarantee of dynamic provable data possession (DPDP) [22] . We describe the data possession game of DPDP between the challenger (acting as the client) and the adversary (acting as the cloud server) as follows.
-The challenger generates a key pair (sk, pk) and gives pk to the adversary.
-The adversary selects a file F associated with the identifier fid to store. The challenger processes the file to form another file F ′ with the help of sk and returns F ′ to the adversary. The challenger stores only some metadata to verify the updates to be performed by the adversary later. The adversary chooses a sequence of updates (of its choice) defined by (updtype i , info i ) for 1 i q 1 (q 1 is polynomial in the security parameter λ) and asks the challenger to initiate the update. For each update, the challenger runs InitUpdate and stores the latest metadata at her end. The adversary sends a proof after executing PerformUpdate. The challenger verifies this proof by running VerifyUpdate and updates her metadata if and only if the proof passes the verification. The adversary is notified about the output of VerifyUpdate for each update.
-Let F * be the final state of the file after q 1 updates. The challenger has the latest metadata for the file F * . Now, she challenges the adversary with a random challenge set Q, and the adversary returns a proof T = (T 1 , T 2 ) to the challenger. The adversary wins the game if the proof passes the verification. The challenger can challenge the adversary q 2 (polynomial in λ) number of times in an attempt to extract (at least) the challenged vectors of F * .
Definition 3 (Security of Dynamic Provable Data Possession).
A dynamic provable data possession scheme is secure if, given any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A who can win the data possession game mentioned above with some non-negligible probability, there exists a polynomial-time extractor algorithm E that can extract (at least) the challenged vectors of the file by interacting (via challenge-response) with A polynomially many times.
Security Analysis
We state and prove the following theorem in order to analyze the security of DSCS I.
Theorem 1.
Given that the hash function used to construct the rank-based authenticated skip list is collisionresistant and the underlying network coding scheme is secure, the DSCS I protocol described in Section 3.3 is secure in the standard model according to Definition 3. Proof. We use the following claims in order to prove Theorem 1.
Claim. Given that the hash function used to construct the rank-based authenticated skip list is collision-resistant, the freshness of the data file is guaranteed in the DSCS I protocol.
Proof. The freshness of storage requires that the cloud server must store an up-to-date version of the data file outsourced by the client. In DSCS I, the hash function h (see = d new ) during the data possession game. Moreover, for each challenge Q, freshness of data is guaranteed by checking the validity of the proof T 2 = {(t i , Π(i))} i∈I with respect to the latest metadata d M (in the procedure Verify) during the data possession game and the extraction phase. If the adversary is able to forge a skip list proof with respect to the latest value of d M (i.e., if it makes the output of some execution of VerifyUpdate or Verify to be 1 without storing the latest authentication tags), then it must have found a collision for the hash function h in some level of the rankbased authenticated skip list. This event occurs with a negligible probability as h is taken to be collision-resistant.
Claim. Given that the underlying network coding scheme is secure in the standard model, the authenticity of the data file is guaranteed in DSCS I.
Proof. The authenticity of storage demands that the cloud server, without storing the challenged vectors and their respective authentication tags appropriately, cannot produce a valid response Now, if possible, we assume that the adversary produces another valid response
, where the first n entries of w ′ are the same as those of y ′ and the (n + i)-th entry is ν i if i ∈ I (0 if i ∈ I). Clearly, w = w ′ . We observe that the procedure Verify executes the procedure SNC.Verify. As Verify(Q, T ′ , pk, fid) outputs 1, it follows that SNC.Verify(w ′ , t ′ , pk, m, n, fid) = 1.
We also note that, for a particular challenge Q, the set of indices I and the corresponding coefficients ν i (for i ∈ I) are randomly chosen by the challenger (data possession game) or by the extractor (extraction phase). As the basis vectors u 1 , . . . , u m for the particular data file F (identified by fid) are unique, their linear combination using fixed coefficients (i-th coefficient is ν i or 0 depending on whether i ∈ I or i ∈ I) is also unique. This unique linear combination is w. Therefore, w ′ ∈ span(u 1 , . . . , u m ).
To sum up, we find a pair (w ′ , t ′ ) for a file with identifier fid such that [w ′ n+1 , w ′ n+2 , . . . , w ′ n+m ] ∈ F m e is not the all-zero vector, SNC.Verify(w ′ , t ′ , pk, m, n, fid) outputs 1 and w ′ ∈ span(u 1 , . . . , u m ) (type-2 forgery as mentioned in Section 2.2). However, since the network coding protocol [12] we use in DSCS I is secure in the standard model, the adversary cannot produce such a response T ′ 1 = (y ′ , t ′ ), except with some probability negligible in the security parameter.
We define a polynomial-time extractor algorithm E that can extract (at least) the challenged vectors (except with negligible probability) by interacting with an adversary A that wins the data possession game mentioned above with some non-negligible probability. As DSCS I satisfies the authenticity and freshness properties mentioned above, A cannot produce a proof T = (T 1 , T 2 ) for a given challenge set Q = {(i, ν i )} i∈I without storing the challenged blocks and their corresponding tags properly, except with some negligible probability. This means that if the output of the procedure Verify is 1 during the extraction phase, the vector y in the proof is the linear combination of the original data vectors v i for i ∈ I using coefficients {ν i } i∈I .
Suppose that the extractor E wants to extract l blocks indexed by J. It challenges A with Q = {(i, ν i )} i∈J . If the proof is valid (checked using Verify), E initializes a matrix M E as [ν 1i ] i∈J , where ν 1i = ν i for each i ∈ J. The extractor challenges A for the same J but with different random coefficients. If the procedure Verify outputs 1 and the vector of coefficients is linearly independent to the existing rows of M E , then E appends this vector to M E as a row. The extractor E runs this procedure until the matrix M E has l linearly independent rows. So, the final form of the full-rank matrix M E is [ν ji ] j∈ [1,l] ,i∈J . Therefore, the challenged blocks can be extracted with the help of Gaussian elimination. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Probabilistic Guarantees
If the server has corrupted a constant fraction (say, β) of vectors in a file, then the server passes an audit with probability p cheat = (1 − β) l , where l is the cardinality of Q. The probability p cheat is very small for large values of l. Typically, l is taken to be O(λ) in order to make the probability p cheat negligible in λ. Thus, the verifier detects a malicious server corrupting β-fraction of the file with probability p detect = 1 − p cheat = 1 − (1 − β) l , and it guarantees the integrity of almost all vectors of the file.
Enabling Privacy-Preserving Audits in DSCS I
The basic DSCS I protocol described in Section 3.3 is publicly verifiable, that is, a third party auditor (TPA) having the knowledge of the public parameters can perform an audit. Chen et al. [16] construct a secure cloud storage protocol for static data using the same SNC protocol [12] . They note that, in order to make an audit privacypreserving, the server adds a random linear combination of some random vectors to the computed value of y to form the final response. Due to the addition of this random component to the resulting vector y, the third party auditor (TPA) cannot gain knowledge (by solving a set of linear equations) of the challenged vectors. Accordingly, we modify our basic DSCS I protocol in order to support privacy-preserving audits in the following way. We change two procedures, Outsource and Prove, from the basic protocol. The rest of the procedures involved in the protocol are the same as in the basic protocol.
-Outsource(F, K, fid): The file F (associated with the identifier fid) consists of m vectors each of them having n blocks. We assume that each of these blocks is an element of F e . Then, for each 1 i m, the i-th vector v i is of the form [v i1 , . . . , v in ] ∈ F n e . For each vector v i , the client selects a random element s i R ← − F e and computes x i such that 
Then, the client uploads the setĨ along with the tags {(s i ,x i )} i∈ [1,k] to the cloud server. 
Thus, during an audit, the server randomizes the linear combination of the challenged vectors with the help of a random linear combination of some predefined vectors prohibiting the TPA from gaining knowledge of the challenged vectors.
Enabling User-Anonymity for Shared Data in DSCS I
In a follow-up work of [16] , Chen et al. [17] extend their SCS protocol for static data to a group setting where the users belonging to a group share the outsourced data (or file) and modify the same. In this scenario, the users in the group delegate the work of generating authentication tags for the vectors (of the file to be outsourced) to a security-mediator [50] . As the tags are generated by the mediator using the same secret key for all users, the cloud server cannot distinguish the users uploading (or updating) the file. The secret key is kept with the mediator only; thus, the users do not have the knowledge of the same. Moreover, a user obtains a tag corresponding to a vector w from the mediator in such a way that the mediator cannot gain knowledge of the content of w. A user outsources (or updates) the file using an anonymous channel [30] . Finally, every user in the group can perform an audit on the file kept in the cloud server. DSCS I can be extended to support anonymity for shared dynamic data as well. The procedures involved are described below.
-KeyGen(1 λ , m, n): The mediator selects two random safe primes p, q of length λ/2 bits each and takes N = pq. It chooses another random prime e of length λ + 1 (in bits) and sets the file identifier fid to be equal to e. The mediator selects g, g 1 , . . . , g n , h 1 , . . . , h m R ← − Z * N . The secret key sk is (p, q), and the public key pk consists of (N, e, g, g 1 , . . . , g n , h 1 , . . . , h m , d M , m, n). Initially, d M is null. Let K = (sk, pk). We assume that every user in the group can update the public key efficiently.
-Blind(w): A user randomly selects vectors {w i } 1 i k and {β i } 1 i k such that w = ( 1 i k β i ·w i ) mod e.
The user send the vectors {w i } 1 i k to the mediator for their respective authentication tags. The mediator sends the tags {t i } 1 i k to the user.
-Unblind({w i , t i } 1 i k ): Due to the homomorphic property of the underlying signature scheme, the user computes the authentication tag t corresponding to the vector w in the same way as discussed in Section 3.3 (see the procedure Prove). -Outsource(F, K, fid): Let the initial file F (associated with the identifier fid) consist of m vectors each of them having n blocks. We assume that each of these blocks is an element of F e . Then, for each 1 i m, the i-th vector v i is of the form [v i1 , . . . , v in ] ∈ F n e . For each vector v i , a user obtains the corresponding authentication tag t i = (s i , x i ) from the security-mediator (using the procedures Blind and Unblind described above) such that s i R ← − F e and
The 
-Verify(Q, T, pk, fid): Using Q = {(i, ν i )} i∈I and T = (y, t) sent by the server, the user performing the audit constructs a vector w = [w 1 , . . . , w n , w n+1 , . . . , w n+m ] ∈ F n+m e , where the first n entries of w are the same as those of y and the (n + i)-th entry is ν i if i ∈ I (0 if i ∈ I). Then, the user checks whether
She also verifies if, for each i ∈ I, Π(i) is a valid proof (with respect to d M ) for t i . The user outputs 1 if the proof passes all the verifications; she outputs 0, otherwise.
We have modified our basic DSCS I protocol (described in Section 3.3) to handle a group of users sharing their data without disclosing their identity to the cloud server. If we require a third party auditor (other than the users in the group) to audit on behalf of the group in a privacy-preserving fashion, it is not hard to see that the same changes (discussed in Section 5) can be applied in the group setting as well.
If we consider a procedure Update to be the triplet of the procedures (InitUpdate, PerformUpdate, VerifyUpdate), such an procedure Update must be performed atomically. Additionally, an update and an audit must not coincide in order to maintain the consistency of the outsourced data.
Performance Analysis of DSCS I
In this section, we discuss about the efficiency of our DSCS I protocol (described in Section 3.3) and compare this scheme with other existing SCS protocols achieving provable data possession guarantees. We also identify some limitations of an SNC-based SCS scheme (for static or dynamic data) compared to the DPDP I scheme (described in Appendix B.1).
Efficiency
The computational cost of the procedures in DSCS I is dominated by the cost of exponentiations (modulo N ). To generate the value x in an authentication tag for each vector (in the procedure Outsource), the client has to perform a multi-exponentiation 3 and calculate the e-th root of the result (see Eqn. 1). The server requires two multi-exponentiations to calculate the value of x (see Eqn. 2 in the procedure Prove). To verify a proof using the procedure Verify, the verifier has to perform a multi-exponentiation and a single exponentiation (see Eqn. 3).
As mentioned in Section 3.2, due to the properties of a skip list [43] , the size of each proof Π (related to the rank-based authenticated skip list), the time required to generate Π and the time required to verify Π are O(log m) with high probability.
Comparison among PDP Schemes
As DSCS I protocol provides provable data possession (PDP) guarantees, we compare our scheme with some other PDP schemes found in the literature. The comparison shown in Table 1 is done based on different parameters related to an audit. In Section 8, we propose a more efficient scheme suitable for append-only data that we mention as DSCS II in Table 1 . Now, we discuss about a few limitations of our DSCS I protocol compared to DPDP I (specifically), since both of them are secure in the standard model, handle dynamic data and offer public verifiability. In DSCS I, the audits are privacy-preserving, that is, a third party auditor (TPA) cannot gain knowledge of the data actually stored in the cloud server. Although the original DPDP I scheme does not offer privacy-preserving audits, this scheme can be modified to support the same (see Appendix B.2). The issues of our scheme compared to the modified DPDP I scheme are mentioned below. For simplicity, we exclude the security parameter λ from complexity parameters (for an audit). The valuem denotes the number of segments the data file is divided in (such that an authentication tag is associated with each segment). For example,m = m in our DSCS (I and II) schemes, where m denotes the number of vectors. The term O(ñ) is added implicitly to each complexity parameter, whereñ is the size of each segment. For example,ñ = n in DSCS I and II, where a vector having n blocks is considered to be a segment. For all the schemes, the storage at the verifier side is O(1), and the storage at the server side is O(|F ′ |) where F ′ is the outsourced file. If l is the cardinality of the challenge set and the server corrupts β fraction of the file, the detection probability p detect = 1 − (1 − β) l for all the schemes (except, in DPDP II, p detect = 1 − (1 − β) Ω(logm) ).
† RO denotes the random oracle model [7] . ‡ Scalable PDP scheme supports deletion, modification and append only for a predefined number of times; insertion is not supported in this scheme. § A small change (making the latest values of dM andm public) is required in the original scheme (see Section B.1). ⋆ ǫ is a constant such that 0 < ǫ < 1. ⋆⋆ In the preliminary version of this paper [46] , we modify DPDP I [22] to make its audits privacy-preserving. The modified DPDP I scheme is described in Appendix B.2. ¶ DSCS II supports only append and modification; arbitrary insertion (or deletion) is not supported.
1. The size of the public key is O(m+ n) in DSCS I. On the other hand, the size of the public key in the modified DPDP I scheme is constant. 2. The authentication tags in DSCS I are of the form (s, x), where s ∈ F e and x ∈ Z * N . An authentication tag in the modified DPDP I scheme is an element of Z * N . Thus, the size of a tag in DSCS I is larger than that in the modified DPDP I scheme by λ + 1 bits (as e is a (λ + 1)-bit prime). 3. In DSCS I, the value of (d M , m) and the h i values in the public key must be changed for each insertion or deletion (only change in d M is required for modification), whereas only the value of (dM ,m) needs to be changed in the modified DPDP I scheme. However, if the server keeps a local copy of the public key (an ordered list containing h i values for i ∈ [1, m]), then small changes are required at the server side. The server inserts the new h value (sent by the client) in (i + 1)-th position in the list (for insertion) or discards the i-th h value (for deletion).
Thus, the proposed DSCS I scheme suffers from the limitations mentioned above. We note that the existing SCS protocol for static data [16] based on the same SNC protocol [12] also suffers from the first two of these limitations. However, in this work, we explore if a secure cloud storage protocol for dynamic data can be constructed from a secure network coding protocol. A more efficient (in terms of the size of the public key or the size of an authentication tag) SNC protocol can lead us to the construction of a more efficient DSCS protocol in future. In the following section, we propose another secure cloud storage protocol (DSCS II) for append-only data that is much more efficient than DSCS I.
More Efficient Solutions for Append-only Data
Although generic dynamic data are useful, append-only data find numerous applications as well. These primarily include archival data from different sources where data are appended to the existing datasets. For example, data obtained from closed circuit television (CCTV) camera, monetary transactions in banks, medical history of patients -all must be kept intact with append being the only possible update. On the other hand, various cloud service providers like Amazon Web Services (AWS) use Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS [24]) to store large volume of data. In HDFS, data blocks are added by an application to a new file. After closing the file, the blocks cannot be removed or modified further; blocks can only be appended by reopening the file. Append-only data are also useful for maintaining log structures (e.g., certificates are stored using append-only log structures in certificate transparency schemes [34, 45] ).
In this section, we construct a more efficient DSCS scheme (DSCS II) for append-only data using the SNC protocol proposed by Boneh et al. [8] that is not suitable for constructing a DSCS scheme for generic dynamic data (see Section 3.1). First, we give a brief overview of the SNC protocol and discuss a key property of it that allows us to construct DSCS II based on the protocol. Then, we provide the construction of the DSCS II scheme.
Homomorphic Network Coding Signature Scheme Proposed by Boneh et al.
Boneh et al. [8] propose a homomorphic network coding signature scheme secure in the random oracle model [7] under the co-computational Diffie Hellman (co-CDH) assumption. We briefly describe the procedures involved in this scheme. The notations are the same as those discussed in Section 2.2. If the equality holds, it outputs 1; it outputs 0, otherwise.
We recall that in a secure cloud storage protocol (using secure network coding), the client divides the file F associated with fid into m vectors each of them having n blocks. The i-th vector v i is of the form [v i1 , . . . , v in ] ∈ F n , ∀i ∈ [1, m] . For each vector v i , the client forms u i = [v i e i ] ∈ F n+m by augmenting the vector v i with the unit coefficient vector e i . If we use the current SNC protocol [8] , the client runs TagGen(V, sk, m, n, fid) to produce, for each i ∈ 
for the vector u i . We observe that the vector index i is embedded in the tag corresponding to the i-th vector. Therefore, the scheme is not suitable for construction of a secure cloud storage for dynamic (in generic sense) data as mentioned in Section 3.1.
DSCS II: An Efficient Solution for Append-only Data
From the previous section, we note that the authentication tags in the SNC protocol [8] are independent of the value m (see Eqn. 10). The size of the public key also does not depend on m. This makes the SNC protocol suitable for constructing a more efficient DSCS scheme. However, as each authentication tag embeds the index of the respective vector, we cannot insert or delete at arbitrary positions of the data file. Since the value of the index i of the vector to be inserted only increases for append-only data, the SNC protocol provides an efficient DSCS protocol (DSCS II). We observe that, for the same reason, the SNC protocol proposed by Gennaro et al. [26] can also be used for such a construction. Although we construct DSCS II to handle append-only data, it supports modifications of existing vectors trivially. DSCS II consists of the following procedures.
-KeyGen(1 λ , m, n): Let G = (G 1 , G 2 , G T , e, ψ) be a bilinear group tuple, where G 1 , G 2 and G T are multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p > 2 λ , and the functions e : G 1 × G 2 → G T (bilinear map) and ψ : G 2 → G 1 are efficiently computable. The client selects g 1 , . . . , g n R ← − G 1 \{1}, h
